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The Director of Central Intelligence


Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 03809-85
31 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:


Acting National Intelligence Officer at Large

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SUBJECT:

Warning Report - Chemical and Biological Warfare

1. Representatives of the Intelligence, Policy and Research and Development Communities met on 16 July to discuss chemical and biological warfare issues. Discussion focused on the contribution of arms trade and technology transfer to the proliferation of chemical weapons.

2. While no warning/forecast issues per se were raised, the meeting highlighted the complexity of potential and actual control measures, which necessarily draw upon intelligence, economic, political and military equities. We anticipate that chemical weapons will continue to spread, in part because the technology can be obtained from many different sources.

3. My summary of significant items from the meeting is attached, as is the list of participants.

Attachments:
As stated



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26 July 1985

WARNING REPORT - CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ISSUES

Proliferation of Chemical Weapons:

Contribution of Arms Trade and Technology Transfer

Current Status

The capability to produce chemical weapons and to wage chemical warfare is spreading throughout the Third World. This proliferation has been stimulated in part by the growing arms market and the broad availability of necessary technology. This trend is likely to continue because:

- the numbers of suppliers of arms and technology are growing;
- suppliers may benefit by gaining political leverage;
- provision of arms and/or technology is financially lucrative; and
- thus far, control measures in technology transfer have been generally unsuccessful.

How rapidly a country is striving to achieve CW-capability may affect the potential for interdiction. A country attempting to become CW-capable quickly will have to rely heavily on purchase of finished or nearly finished products, some of which are unique and already subject to export controls. With greater time available, the acquiring country can establish several alternate supply routes and/or develop the building blocks domestically, thereby reducing dependence on external suppliers for unique materials and expertise. In the latter case, points of possible interdiction in the process are fewer and the likelihood of arresting development less.

Publicity about the spread of chemical weapons will make the task of monitoring proliferation even more difficult because it reinforces the inclination to make the program covert.

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